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Abstract.
 
Examining data for Australia and 101 trading partners that span the years 1989–2000,
we find immigrants from nations afforded preference under the White Australia policy exert
greater proportional influences on Australian imports from their home countries compared to
immigrants from nations not privy to such preference. Immigrants from this latter group of
countries influence Australian exports to their home countries proportionally more than do
immigrants from the former group. We also find immigrant-trade links vary across disaggregated
measures of  trade. The results suggest that cultural diversity, affected here by immigration policy,
is relevant to a nation’s trade patterns.
 
1
 
. 
 
Australia’s continued integration into the global economy has entailed more
intense trade and factor flows. Between 1970 and 2000, Australia’s combined
exports and imports increased from 26.1% of gross domestic product (GDP)
to 45.9%. Similarly, the sum of its foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and
outflows as a share of GDP nearly doubled from 2.4% to 4.4%. Although the
proportion of Australia’s population that was foreign-born only increased from
19.9% to 21.3% (World Bank, 2006), the ethnic composition of immigrant
inflows changed dramatically. Capital flows often increase trade due to parent
firm–affiliate interaction. Likewise, immigrants have been found to exert a posi-
tive influence on trade between home and host countries. Gould (1994),
examining the USA, first reports an immigrant-trade link and subsequent studies
document positive links for several countries. This paper contributes to the
literature by examining Australia’s immigrant-trade link and considering
potential variation in the effects of immigrants on trade across immigrant
home countries classified by historical access to preferences under Australian
immigration policy.
Immigrants are thought to influence trade through two broad channels.
First, immigrants may arrive with preferences for home country goods that
are unavailable in the host nation. If  so, host country imports from the home
country may increase. Second, immigrants may increase imports from and/or
exports to their home nation if  they possess knowledge or skills that reduce
trade related transaction costs. For example, immigrants may be connected to
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home country social or business networks that facilitate trade or possess language
skills or knowledge of home country customs that enable business to be con-
ducted with the home nation (Globerman, 2001). In both cases, greater cultural
distance between the populations of home and host nations may engender a
stronger immigrant effect on trade. As a nation’s cultural identity is an amalgam
of its population’s attitudes, customs and beliefs, it follows that immigration
policy can influence a host nation’s cultural identity and, in doing so, may
affect trade. Given the associated policy relevance, an accurate account of the
immigrant-trade relationship may prove beneficial with respect to the future
formulation of immigration and trade policies.
Until the early 1950s, Australian immigration policy – known informally as
the White Australia policy – afforded preferential treatment to British emigrants.
As a result, Australia’s population at the close of World War II was over-
whelmingly of British ethnicity. For example, in 1947, Britain (89.8%), northern
and western Europe (5.7%), and southern Europe (1.5%) collectively accounted
for 97% of Australia’s ethnic composition (Price, 1999).
 
1
 
 In that same year,
seeking labour for post-war reconstruction and national defence, Australia
adopted annual immigrant inflow targets equal to 1% of the population with
a desired ratio of ten British immigrants to every one non-British immigrant
(Castles, 2000). However, like Australia, Britain faced manpower shortages and
between 1945 and 1960 only 60% of Australia’s 1.6 million immigrant arrivals
were British (Bouscaren, 1963). This led Australia, beginning in the 1950s, to
relax the White Australia policy by formally agreeing to provide preference to
emigrants from 11 other European nations.
 
2
 
The demographics of post-war immigrant inflows altered the ethnic makeup
of Australia’s population, yet even with formal abandonment of the White
Australia policy in 1973 and an increased emphasis placed on the promotion
of multiculturalism, as recently as 1999 persons of British descent accounted
for 69.9% of Australia’s ethnic composition. Adding the influence of continental
Europe, results in a collective share of 83.8% (Price, 1999). Thus, while ethnic
and cultural diversity have increased, Australia remains very much culturally
akin to the UK and other European nations. As a result of the changes in
Australian immigration policy, more recent immigrant arrivals have often been
from nations that are culturally distinct from Europe and, hence, from Australia.
For example, 80.1% of  the increase in Australia’s foreign-born population
during the 1990s was due to immigrant arrivals from Asia and the Pacific. The
greater cultural distance between Australia and the home countries of these
more recent immigrants may have lead to stronger influences being exerted on
trade as compared with that of immigrants from nations afforded preference
under the White Australia policy.
 
1
 
Price (1996) notes that birthplace origins are not the same as ethnic origins. We acknowledge
this and, due to data constraints, proceed cautiously when employing country of birth as repre-
sentative of ethnic origin.
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The appendix provides a list of  nations in the dataset, identified by White Australia policy
association.
  ,    
 
491
 
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 
To discern whether increased cultural pluralism, fostered through abandonment
of the White Australia policy, generated variation in immigrant trade links across
home countries, we classify the UK, New Zealand and home countries that entered
into emigration agreements with Australia as White Australia policy (
 
WAP
 
) nations.
Other home countries are classified as non-White Australia policy (
 
NWAP
 
) nations.
Using data for Australia and 101 trading partners that span the years 1989–2000,
we find pro-trade immigrant effects; however, the effects vary across 
 
WAP
 
 and
 
NWAP
 
 classifications. Immigrants from 
 
WAP
 
 nations exert greater propor-
tional influences on Australian imports from their respective home countries
than do immigrants from 
 
NWAP
 
 nations, while immigrants from 
 
NWAP
 
nations exert stronger influences on Australian exports to their home countries.
Variation in links is also reported across several disaggregated trade measures.
Likewise, estimated per-immigrant effects on trade are consistently greater for
immigrants from 
 
NWAP
 
 nations. The findings provide greater insight into the
channels via which immigrants affect trade and indicate that cultural diversity,
affected by immigration policy in this case, is relevant to a nation’s trade
patterns. Section 2 introduces the econometric specification and the data.
Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, while Section 4 concludes.
2
 
.  
 
Prior studies of the immigrant-trade relationship have employed variations of
the gravity model.
 
3
 
 In its basic form, the model posits that trade between two
nations (
 
T
 
ijt
 
) increases with the nations’ combined economic mass (
 
Y
 
it
 
Y
 
jt
 
) and
decreases with distance (
 
D
 
ij
 
) between nations. The subscripts 
 
i
 
, 
 
j
 
 and 
 
t
 
 represent
Australia, home nations and time (in years), respectively. Higher home country
GDP (
 
Y
 
jt
 
) implies greater export markets for Australia and an increased prob-
ability of Australian imports. Similarly, higher Australian GDP (
 
Y
 
it
 
) signals
an increased capacity to both export and to import. Distance between Sydney
and the capital city of nation 
 
j
 
, measured in kilometres using the great circle
method, is a proxy for transport costs. 
 
Λ
 
 is the constant of proportionality,
as equation (1) illustrates,
(1)
Researchers have, over time, extended the basic gravity specification to
include a number of factors that potentially facilitate or inhibit trade. We draw
upon the existing literature in formulating an augmented gravity specification.
To control for additional factors that may enhance or diminish trade flows,
we append to equation (1) several variables that, potentially, facilitate or inhibit
trade. Taking natural logarithms of the continuous variables on both sides of
 
3
 
Tinbergen (1962) first applies the gravity equation to trade. Recent research (Bergstrand, 1985;
Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Davis, 1995; Deardorff, 1998; Feenstra 
 
et al
 
., 2001; Eaton and
Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Anderson, 1979) has established theoretical
foundations for the model.
T
Y Y
Dijt
it jt
ij
  .=



Λ
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the resulting equation and adding an assumed independently and identically
distributed error term, 
 
ε
 
ijt
 
, yields equation (2),
(2)
The series of dependent variables, 
 
T
 
ijt
 
, includes values for aggregate imports
and exports, along with trade values for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors, goods at one-digit Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC),
and differentiated and homogenous (reference-priced and organized exchange)
products.
 
4
 
 These latter values are constructed using four-digit SITC-level trade
data and Rauch (1999) product classifications. Goods traded on public exchanges
are classified as organized exchange products, while reference-priced goods are
those with prices regularly listed in industry trade publications. All other goods
are considered differentiated. Trade data are from Feenstra 
 
et al
 
. (2005), except
for the one-digit SITC level data which are from the SourceOECD database.
Estimating equation (2) using each of the various measures of trade increases
the depth and breadth of our analysis. While aggregate trade values permit
examination of a general immigrant-trade link, use of disaggregated trade values
as dependent variables enables us to consider variation across sectors and types
of goods. This, in turn, provides for a more detailed understanding of the
relationship between immigrants and trade.
The stock of immigrants from nation 
 
j
 
 residing in Australia, 
 
IMM
 
ijt
 
, is inter-
acted with two dummy variables, 
 
WAP
 
j
 
 and 
 
NWAP
 
j
 
, respectively, to produce
a pair of variables that identify immigrants from home countries that received
preferential treatment under the White Australia policy and those that were
not privy to such preference. The interaction of the dummy variables with the
immigrant stock variable permits us to test whether or not the abandonment
of the White Australia policy has contributed to any variation in immigrant-
trade links. We acknowledge that an immigrant’s influence on trade may
depend on the immigrant’s skill level and/or visa status. For example, ‘business’
or ‘skilled’ migrants may increase Australian trade more, on average, than
would the typical ‘family’ migrant; however, given available data, we are unable
to address this question.
The immigrant stock variable is constructed as follows. Census data from
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) provide country level immigrant
stocks at three points in time: 1991, 1996 and 2001. We employ these values
as benchmarks. ABS data on immigrant inflows during the years 1992–2000
 
4
 
A listing of one-digit SITC sectors is provided in the appendix.
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are used to estimate immigrant stock values for intra-census years. For example,
immigrant stocks for the years 1992–1996 are estimated as follows,
(3)
 
δ
 
j
 
 is an adjustment factor accounting for return migration and death of immi-
grants during intra-census years. It is the immigrant stock from nation 
 
j
 
 in
Australia given by the 1996 census less the sum of immigrants from nation 
 
j
 
in Australia in 1991 and the inflow from nation 
 
j 
 
during the years 1991–1996
divided by six,
(4)
For the years 1997–2000 the immigrant stock variable is constructed similarly,
using 2001 census values and 1997–2001 immigrant inflow data. The combina-
tion of the 1992–1995 and 1997–2000 estimated immigrant stock values and
the 1991 and 1996 benchmark values results in a set of immigrant values for
each nation over the years 1991–2000.
The remaining explanatory variables include the lagged first-difference of the
dependent variable. Gould (1994) employs the one-period lagged value of the
dependent variable as an explanatory variable and interprets the resulting
regression specification as a partial adjustment model. This is akin to control-
ling for the effects of what might be called trade inertia. Eichengreen and Irwin
(1996) also include the one-year lag of the dependent variable to capture such
effects. Following Wooldridge (2002), we test for autocorrelation in our panel
data and fail to rule out the presence of first-order autocorrelation for each
of the dependent variables used in our estimations. In the presence of AR(1) in
the data, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the empirical specification
would bias estimated coefficients downward and potentially obscure any meaningful
effects of changes in explanatory variables, including those of immigrants, on
trade. As a result, we include the lagged first-difference of the dependent variable
(given as 
 
∆ 
 
ln 
 
T
 
ijt
 
–1
 
 
 
=
 
 
 
∆ 
 
ln
 
 T
 
ijt
 
–1
 
 – ln
 
 T
 
ijt
 
–2
 
), rather than the lagged value of the
dependent variable, to control for inertia effects. As changes in the dependent
variable are related to trends in bilateral trade flows, rather than size or distance,
inclusion of  this variable does not violate the theoretical foundations of  the
gravity specification, nor does it lead to downward biasing of coefficients.
To capture potential effects of  price variation, we include lagged one-year
nominal exchange rates (
 
XRATE
 
ijt
 
) (IMF, 2006). Given as annual average values
of Australian dollars per foreign currency unit, an increase in the value indicates
a depreciation of  the Australian dollar and thus is expected to yield increases
in Australian exports and decreases in Australian imports. Also controlling
for the influences of  relative prices, we include the ratio of  GDP deflators
(
 
Y deflator
 
j
 
/
 
Y deflator
 
i
 
)
 
t
 
 (World Bank, 2006). While Gould (1994) employs US
IMM IMM INFLOWijt ij ijt j
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and home country GDP deflators separately, we follow the methodology of
Head and Ries (1998) as we believe this measure of  relative prices is better
suited, as compared with including Australian and home country GDP deflators
separately, to capture the expected positive influences of  relatively higher
(lower) home country prices on Australian imports (exports).
Since trade with Australia may depend on outside (i.e. non-Australian) trading
opportunities available to potential trading parties in each home country, we
include a measure of the economic remoteness of each home country. Given
as 
 
REM
 
jt
 
 
 
=
 
 1/ [(
 
Y
 
kt
 
/
 
Y
 
wt
 
)/
 
D
 
jk
 
], the remoteness variable is a measure of quasi-
distance (Wagner 
 
et al
 
., 2002). 
 
D
 
jk
 
 is the distance between home country 
 
j
 
 and
each nation 
 
k
 
 other than Australia, 
 
Y
 
kt
 
 is the total output of country 
 
k
 
 and
 
Y
 
wt
 
 represents gross global product (World Bank, 2006).
 
5
 
 A country may be
economically remote if  it is geographically isolated (e.g. New Zealand) or
located near relatively small economies (e.g. South Africa). Such nations face
a relative lack of trading opportunities and may find Australia to be a preferred
partner.
It could be argued that the pro-trade influence of immigrants is the result
of recent trade liberalization in 
 
NWAP
 
 nations. Similarly, relative openness to
trade may stem from greater trading infrastructure; for example, airports,
seaports, rail lines and highway systems. To control for such possibilities, we
include a trade openness variable (OPENjt) which is given as the sum of imports
and exports divided by GDP (Head and Ries, 1998). Hutchinson (2002) and
Girma and Yu (2002), examining US and UK trade, respectively, find common
language to be an important determinant of trade flows. Shared languages
may permit contracts to be more easily written and interpreted or reduce
search costs associated with finding suitable trading partners. Accordingly, we
include a dummy variable equal to one if  English is a common language in
the home country (US CIA, 2006). Finally, following Gould (1994), we include
Australian and home country populations (POPit and POPjt, respectively) to
represent market size (World Bank, 2006). All values, trade flows and other-
wise, have been normalized to 2000 US dollars where applicable.
Immigrants from the nations included in this dataset comprise 18.4% of the
Australian population. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. The average
immigrant stock is significantly greater for the 13 nations that were afforded
preference under the White Australia policy. The collective immigrant popula-
tion from these nations (11.3% of the total population) is sizeably larger than
the total immigrant population (7.1%) from the 88 nations not afforded preference
under the White Australia policy. Australia tends to import relatively more
from and export more to WAP nations, and WAP nations have, on average,
higher average GDP values; so much so that, in comparison with the typical
NWAP nation, WAP nations are relatively closed to trade. WAP nations are
also significantly less economically remote than NWAP nations; however, they
are located, on average, a greater distance from Australia.
5 If j = k, internal distance is the square root of the country’s mass times 0.4 (Head and Mayer,
2000).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all home countries and for WAP/NWAP subsamples
Variable Description
All home countries
N = 1010
NWAP countries
N = 880
WAP countries
N = 130
Tijt Real exports, total  461,788.90  437,314.70  627,460.5***
(1,544,632) (1,621 423) (846,162.80)
Real imports, total  486,334.50  400,345.40  1,068,414.00*
(1,554,189) (1,589,043) (1,138,347)
IMMijt Immigrant stock  33,130.80  14,727.79*  157,705.00*
(116,504.3) (27,016.52) (288,518.80)
Dij Distance (in miles)  13,369.57  13,201.90  14,504.62*
(3,514.9) (3,402.5690) (4,031.974)
XRATEijt-1 Exchange rate (one-year lag)  1,032.80  1,169.5460  107.0323*
(10,848) (11,615.77) (293.6987)
Yjt Real GDP (home country)  275,987.96  234,637.47  555,898.95*
(964,929.09) (995,998.75) (657,678.96)
Y deflatorjt GDP deflator (home country)  105.6778  104.8121  111.5379*
(16.87136) (17.2191) (12.8974)
Y deflatorjt/Y deflatorit GDP deflator ratio  1.0523  1.0439  1.109*
(0.1807) (0.1854) (0.1314)
OPENjt Trade openness  0.7083  0.7156  0.6586*
(0.388) (0.4091) (0.1851)
POPjt Population  49,111,783.90  52,907,343.91  23,442,069.92*
(15,377,902) (163,697,640.97) (25,468,345.39)
REMjt Economic remoteness  6,737.85  7,159.151**  3,885.94*
(4,125.54) (4,093.3390) (3,089.96)
ENGLISHj Common language  0.3762  0.3864  0.3077
(0.4847) (0.4872) (0.4633)
Yit Real GDP (Australia)  383,263.85 ---- ----
(44,411.21) ---- ----
Y deflatorit GDP deflator (Australia)  100.7173 ---- ----
(4.6335) ---- ----
POPit Population (Australia)  18,209,220 ---- ----
(612,790.70) ---- ----
Standard deviations in parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote statistical significance from the overall mean at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Trade values are
in thousands of 2000 US dollars. GDP values are in millions of 2000 US dollars. NWAP = non-White Australia policy, WAP = White Australia policy.
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3.  
As mentioned, we examine whether increased cultural pluralism, fostered through
abandonment of the White Australia policy, has produced variation in immigrant-
trade links across home countries. Doing so provides a more accurate account
of the immigrant-trade relationship and may prove beneficial to the formula-
tion of future immigration and trade policies. Using US data, Gould (1994)
first documents an immigrant-trade link. Subsequent research has reported
positive relationships between immigrants and trade for several nations. For
example, Wagner et al. (2002), Head and Ries (1998) and Helliwell (1997)
examine immigrant-trade links for Canada. Similarly, Ching and Chen (2000)
report a positive relationship between immigration and Canada-Taiwan trade.
Blanes (2003), Piperakis et al. (2003) and Bryant et al. (2004) report links for
Spain, Greece and New Zealand, respectively, and, at the sub-national level,
Combes et al. (2005) finds evidence of an intra-France migrant-trade relation-
ship. Several studies also identify a link between immigrants and US state
exports.6 Few studies have explored variation in immigrant effects across home
countries and none have considered a potential Australian immigrant-trade
link. White (2007), employing average income as a proxy for relative economic
development, finds immigrants from low income countries drive the US
immigrant-trade link.
The study most similar to our examination of the Australian immigrant-
trade link may be Girma and Yu (2002). Examining UK trade with 48 nations
over the 1981–1993 period, the authors stratify their sample into two groups:
‘Commonwealth’ and ‘non-Commonwealth’ nations. A positive immigrant-
trade link is reported only for the latter group. The authors contend that per-
sonal contacts and network connections apply to all immigrants, regardless of
home country. Thus, associated influences on trade would be relatively uniform
across home countries. Similarly, commonality of legal norms and judicial systems,
formal and informal contracting structures, and communications systems between
the UK and Commonwealth-affiliated home countries diminish immigrants’
abilities to affect trade. This suggests that institutional dissimilarity between
the UK and non-Commonwealth home countries permits immigrants from
such nations to enhance trade flows. Classifying nations by WAP/NWAP status
permits the isolation of the respective influences of immigrants on trade. Unlike
Commonwealth affiliation, which entails much stronger host country influences
on the home country in terms of governmental and, hence, institutional struc-
tures, WAP/NWAP status involves much weaker host country influence (and,
perhaps, only a negligible influence) on the internal structures of the home
countries. As a result, classification of home countries according to WAP/
NWAP status permits consideration that cultural pluralism, in this instance
resulting from a host country shifting away from a restrictive immigration
policy, affects trade flows.
6 See Bandyopadhyay et al. (2006) for a review of related research.
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We select iterative feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) as the appro-
priate econometric estimation method. Our selection of FGLS is dictated by
the presence of first-order autocorrelation and panel-level heteroskedasticity
in the original data.7 FGLS allows the estimation of efficient coefficients when
AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and/or
heteroskedasticity across panels are present. Thus, the estimated coefficients
we provide in Tables 2 and 3 are based on iterative FGLS estimations where
7 We follow Wooldridge (2002) and test for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the panel
data. Both Wooldridge and Breusch-Pagan tests, respectively, reject (at P > 0.001) the null hypoth-
eses of no autocorrelation and the homoskedastic panels assumption. Since we have time invariant
country characteristics, the use of fixed effects regression is ruled out. Thus, we select FGLS as
our estimation strategy. We also use the panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) technique for
estimating variances as an alternative estimation strategy to check the robustness of our findings
(see Subsection 3.3 for details).
Table 2. Immigrant-trade links, with and without White Australia policy distinction
Dependent variables ln exportsijt ln importsijt ln exportsijt ln importsijt
ln immigrantsijt 0.4646* 0.1758* ---- ----
(0.0356) (0.0325) ---- ----
ln immigrantsijt x White Australiaj ---- ---- 0.3882* 0.2416*
---- ---- (0.0295) (0.0319)
ln immigrantsijt x non-White Australiaj ---- ---- 0.4721* 0.1882*
---- ---- (0.0326) (0.0308)
Lagged first-difference of dep. variable –0.0277 0.0056 –0.0253 0.0061
(0.0188) (0.0148) (0.019) (0.0147)
ln distanceij –1.4659* –2.0129* –1.667* –2.1753*
(0.1147) (0.2056) (0.1281) (0.2369)
ln exchange rateijt-1 0.0221 –0.0614** 0.0137 –0.0845*
(0.0154) (0.0246) (0.0141) (0.0241)
ln GDPjt (home country) 1.108* 1.5136* 1.1057* 1.3858*
(0.0412) (0.0464) (0.0377) (0.0373)
ln GDPit (Australia) –3.1932* –0.0219 –3.3529* 0.4735
(0.8944) (0.7978) (0.8862) (0.7153)
ln (GDP deflatorjt/GDP deflatorit) –2.086* –0.8011** –2.1421* –1.2216*
(0.345) (0.3416) (0.3342) (0.2998)
ln openjt 0.9849* 0.1235*** 0.9254* 0.1219***
(0.0756) (0.0658) (0.0717) (0.0648)
ln populationjt (home country) 0.0565*** –0.2172* –0.0682*** –0.1669*
(0.0311) (0.0595) (0.0407) (0.0594)
ln populationit (Australia) 3.9849 –2.0477 4.0371 –2.7123
(3.1065) (2.7336) (3.0817) (2.4654)
ln remotejt 0.3706* –0.1847 0.1097 –0.1742
(0.0774) (0.1194) (0.0732) (0.1099)
ENGLISHj 0.2007** 1.4985* 0.1307 1.4413*
(0.1022) (0.1572) (0.0912) (0.1582)
Constant 9.5552 30.2588 19.3732 32.2236
(28.8499) (25.4529) (28.4008) (22.8131)
N   1010 1010   1010 1010
Wald χ2   6503* 3200*   7397* 6948*
Log likelihood –1003 –664 –1029 –652
All dependent variables have been converted to 2000 US dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significance from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Summary of proportional immigrant effects on exports and imports
Exports Imports
Trade measure
NWAP
home countries
WAP
home countries
NWAP
home countries
WAP
home countries
Conservative product classification
Differentiated products 0.440* 0.426* 0.322* 0.416*
(0.045) (0.047) (0.041) (0.062)
Reference-priced products 0.461* 0.238* −0.003 −0.049
(0.067) (0.075) (0.031) (0.037)
Organized exchange products 0.622* 0.370* 0.091*** 0.441*
(0.064) (0.079) (0.047) (0.053)
Liberal product classification
Differentiated products 0.408* 0.403* 0.307* 0.399*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.041) (0.064)
Reference-priced products 0.451* 0.291* 0.011 −0.044
(0.073) (0.091) (0.024) (0.032)
Organized exchange products 0.645* 0.378* 0.19* 0.398*
(0.059) (0.071) (0.037) (0.039)
One-digit SITC industry sector
Non-manufacturing 0.257*** 0.03 0.464*** 0.345***
(0.051) (0.057) (0.050) (0.063)
SITC-0: Food and live animals 0.231* 0.091 0.482* 0.416*
(0.078) (0.100) (0.044) (0.048)
SITC-1: Beverages and tobacco –0.009 –0.007 0.029** 0.119*
(0.019) (0.045) (0.014) (0.031)
SITC-2: Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0.164* –0.086 0.003 0.148**
(0.051) (0.070) (0.055) (0.064)
SITC-3: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0.072 0.001 0.007 0.214*
(0.044) (0.061) (0.031) (0.053)
SITC-4: Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.043 0.143* –0.001 –0.04
(0.042) (0.050) (0.018) (0.032)
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Manufacturing 0.187* 0.103*** 0.083* –0.198*
(0.044) (0.058) (0.043) (0.050)
SITC-5: Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 0.141** 0.041 0.087* 0.022
(0.063) (0.077) (0.048) (0.066)
SITC-6: Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 0.129** 0.001 0.101*** –0.102
(0.057) (0.069) (0.055) (0.065)
SITC-7: Machinery and transport equipment 0.238* 0.358* –0.047 –0.463*
(0.041) (0.051) (0.036) (0.058)
SITC-8: Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.158* 0.021 0.289* 0.154*
(0.038) (0.052) (0.045) (0.055)
SITC-9: Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 0.297* 0.216** –0.007 –0.168*
 (0.067)  (0.088)  (0.021)  (0.052)
Standard deviations are in parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significance from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. NWAP = non-White Australia policy,
WAP = White Australia policy.
Exports Imports
Trade measure
NWAP
home countries
WAP
home countries
NWAP
home countries
WAP
home countries
Table 3. Continued.
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the panel-level autocorrelation of order 1 and cross-sectional correlation and/
or panel-level heteroskedasticity are corrected for. The results are, thus, asymp-
totically efficient and maximum likelihood estimates of the true parameters
underlying the effect of the variables theoretically hypothesized to influence
Australian trade flows.
Accordingly, columns (a) and (b) of Table 2 present results obtained when
aggregate exports and imports, respectively, are employed as dependent variables
and no distinction is made regarding WAP or NWAP classification. Columns
(c) and (d) present results obtained when allowing for variation in immigrant
effects across classifications. In all estimations, coefficients on immigrant stock
variables are positive and significant. Focusing first on results presented in columns
(a) and (b), in response to an assumed 1% increase in the immigrant stock, Australian
exports to and imports from the typical home country are estimated to rise
by 0.46% and 0.18%, respectively. We consider this as a confirmation of the
pro-trade effect of immigrants and support for immigrant-trade links reported
in earlier studies. That the proportional influences of immigrants on host country
exports are greater than the corresponding influence on imports is consistent
with results reported by Gould (1994), Girma and Yu (2000) and Combes et al.
(2005). However, it is not necessary to observe such a pattern. For example,
White (2007) and both Wagner et al. (2002) and Head and Ries (1998) find
pro-import effects of immigrants that exceed their pro-export effects.
In columns (c) and (d), we report results where we differentiate the effects
of immigrants by their home countries’ status under Australian immigration
policy. The results indicate that, in response to an assumed 1% increase in the
number of immigrants from WAP nations, Australian exports to such nations
increase by 0.39% while Australian imports increase by 0.24%. In comparison,
assuming a like-immigrant stock increase, Australian exports to NWAP nations
rise by 0.47% while imports from such nations increase by 0.19%. Tests of the
null hypothesis of equality of coefficients on the terms interacting the immigrant
stock variable with the WAP and NWAP dummy variables also consistently
reject the hypothesis at P > 0.001. Thus, there appears to be support for the
notion of variation in immigrant-trade links across WAP and NWAP nations.
Specifically, compared with immigrants from WAP home nations, immigrants
from NWAP nations exert a stronger proportional influence on exports to their
home countries and a weaker, yet positive, proportional influence on Australian
imports from their home countries.
The remaining coefficients in Table 2 conform generally to a priori expecta-
tions. Coefficients on the lagged first-difference of the dependent variables are
not significant. Greater distance from Australia, implying higher transport costs,
reduces trade between the home country and Australia. As expected, higher home
country GDP corresponds to greater Australian exports. Coefficients on lagged
exchange rate variables are significant and negative with respect to Australian
imports. This implies that depreciation of the Australian dollar against the
home countries’ currencies substantially decreases Australia’s imports. Australia’s
exports, on the other hand, appear not to be sensitive to depreciation of the currency.
The coefficients on the ratios of GDP deflators are negative and significant in
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all estimations. Assuming alternative sources for goods exist, higher relative
prices and currency values may be expected to decrease trade.
Coefficients on the home country population variables are positive and negative
in columns (a) and (b), respectively. Intuitively, this would mean that larger
populations imply larger markets for Australian exports to serve. That larger
home country populations correspond with lower Australian imports also
makes sense when one considers that Australia imports more from WAP nations,
which have significantly lower populations compared with NWAP nations (see
Table 1). Inclusion of WAP and NWAP dummy variables absorbs much of the
variation across home country classifications and, as a result, coefficients in
columns (c) and (d) on home country population variables become negative
for both exports and imports. Home country economic remoteness increases
Australian exports, yet appears to decrease Australian imports. The increase
in exports may indicate a lack of alternative source markets available to home
countries. Similarly, the negative relationship between home country remoteness
and imports may reflect that Australia imports significantly more from WAP
nations, which are less remote than the typical NWAP nation. Coefficients on
the English dummy variables are positive and generally significant; suggesting
that commonality of language facilitates trade. Similarly, coefficients on the
trade openness variables are positive and significant in all estimations.
3.1. Disaggregated trade measures and immigrant-trade links
To further explore the Australian immigrant-trade relationship, we first consider
variation in links across products by degree of differentiation. The product
classification system developed by Rauch (1999) categorizes four-digit SITC
industry trade values as differentiated, reference-priced or organized exchange
products. The latter two classifications can be considered homogenous goods. Both
liberal and conservative classifications are applied, with the conservative classification
more apt to identify industries as producing organized exchange products.8 We
also consider variation in immigrant-trade links across non-manufactured (SITC-
0 through SITC-4) and manufactured (SITC-5 through SITC-9) goods producing
sectors. Finally, we examine the immigrant-trade relationship using trade data
at the one-digit SITC level. Since data at the one-digit SITC are aggregations of
four-digit SITC industries, examination of immigrant-trade links generated when
estimating equation (2) using disaggregated trade values as dependent variables
can be undertaken with knowledge of the corresponding sector’s degree of product
differentiation. Table 3 presents estimated proportional immigrant effects.9
Across WAP and NWAP classifications, we find that immigrants exert
comparable proportional influences on Australian exports and imports of
8 The liberal classification lists 12.28% of industries as producing organized exchange goods, while
the conservative classification identifies 17.83%. A test of difference in means yields a t-statistic of
3.79. No significant differences are found across classifications for differentiated or referenced priced
products.
9 The full set of estimation results is available upon request.
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differentiated products. When considering the effects of immigrants on trade
of reference-priced and organized exchange products, immigrants from NWAP
nations exert larger proportional effects on exports than do immigrants from WAP
nations. Conversely, immigrants from WAP nations tend to increase imports
of  organized exchange products proportionally more so than do immigrants
from NWAP nations. It is interesting to note that the proportional influences
of  immigrants from NWAP nations on Australian exports are consistently
of greater magnitude, across the Rauch product classifications, compared with the
pro-export effects of immigrants from WAP nations. However, when considering
pro-import effects, the influences of immigrants from WAP nations are greater
than the corresponding influences of immigrants from NWAP nations.
Examining the influences of immigrants on non-manufactured (SITC-0 through
SITC-4 sectors) and manufactured (SITC-5 through SITC-9 sectors) goods trade,
we find immigrants from NWAP nations increase Australian exports and imports
of both non-manufactured and manufactured products. The influence of immigrants
from WAP nations is less pronounced, with significant increases reported only for
imports of non-manufactured products and exports of manufactured products.
Comparing relative immigrant-trade links across sectors and home country
classifications reveals an interesting regularity. As mentioned, many studies have
reported proportional pro-import influences of immigrants that are greater than
observed pro-export effects. Consistent with these studies, we report propor-
tional immigrant influences on imports of non-manufactured products that are
consistently of greater magnitude than the influences of immigrants on exports
of such products. However, when we consider the extent to which immigrants
affect trade in manufactured products, the proportional influence on exports
is greater than the corresponding influence on imports in almost all cases.
The manufacturing sector is comprised of one-digit SITC sectors that have above-
average shares of differentiated products. Conversely, summation of reference-priced
and organized exchange product shares provide a measure of the homogeneity of
each sector’s product mix. The one-digit SITC sectors that comprise the non-
manufacturing sector have above-average shares of homogenous products. This
helps to explain the observed variation in immigrant-trade links. If  immigrants,
as hypothesized, influence trade through preferences and their abilities to exploit
information asymmetries and/or business or social network connections, it follows
that preference effects will be more pronounced for trade in differentiated products
and that positive influences on trade in relatively homogenous products would
stem from an ability to acquire and/or provide lower-cost substitutes.
The proportional immigrant effects, taken collectively, suggest that the abil-
ities of immigrants in promoting trade are not necessarily the same for both
imports and exports. Thus, immigrants from WAP and NWAP nations exert
influences that, at the aggregate level, result in similar outcomes (i.e. increased
trade) even though the means by which trade is increased and the sectors,
product types and products affected vary considerably across WAP and NWAP
classifications. That immigrants from NWAP nations exert greater proportional
influences on trade in non-manufactured products (i.e. in relatively homo-
genous products) may be the result of immigrants from these nations, generally
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speaking, having greater opportunities, or being better-able (i.e. more adept),
to exploit associated information asymmetries and network connections, compared
with immigrants from WAP nations. An alternative explanation for the
observed variation is that, since WAP and NWAP status is based on Australian
immigration policy rather than Australia-home country institutional similarities,
greater cultural distance between Australia and NWAP immigrants’ home
countries may underlie the Australian immigrant-trade relationship. Either scenario
may be linked to the abandonment of the White Australia policy and the
subsequent increase in cultural pluralism.
3.2. Estimated per-immigrant effects
Using the significant coefficients presented in Tables 2 and 3 and observed
changes in immigrant stock and trade variables, we construct annual per-immigrant
effects and present them in Table 4. These estimates are derived using values
from 95% confidence intervals that correspond to proportional effects. The
results indicate that a typical immigrant from a WAP nation increases Australian
exports to her home country by $138 per year (lower bound: $117; upper
bound: $158), and Australian imports from her home country by $134 (lower
bound: $99; upper bound: $168). A typical immigrant from an NWAP nation
exerts a more pronounced effect on Australian trade with her home country.
Australian exports to and imports from an NWAP home country are estimated
to increase by $1756 (lower bound: $1519; upper bound: $1993) and $569
(lower bound: $387; upper bound: $752), respectively.
That the estimated per-immigrant effects for immigrants from WAP nations
are quite small is taken to imply that corresponding proportional immigrant effects,
while statistically significant, are of minor practical significance. However, estimated
per-immigrant effects for NWAP nation immigrants are not only of considerably
greater magnitude, they are consistent with findings from earlier studies. For
example, Head and Ries (1998) report per-immigrant effects on Canadian exports
and imports equal to approximately $3000 and $8000, respectively. Also examining
Canada, Wagner et al. (2002) report an import effect of $944 and an export
effect of $312. Gould (1994) estimates the marginal immigrant increases US
imports and exports by $456 and $327, respectively. White (2007), considering
the effects of immigrants from low income home countries on US trade, reports
per-immigrant effects of $2967 for imports and $910 for exports. Use of dis-
aggregated trade values and corresponding significant coefficients further
reveals the stark cleavage in estimated per-immigrant effects between NWAP
and WAP nations. Across product classifications, effects attributable to immigrants
from NWAP nations are, in the majority of cases, greater than the corresponding
effects of immigrants from WAP nations.
3.3. Robustness checks and sensitivity analysis
To analyse the sensitivity of our results, we estimate several alternative regres-
sion specifications and also examine sample composition. First, we estimate
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Table 4. Estimated per-immigrant effects on exports and imports
NWAP home countries WAP home countries All home countries
Trade Measure
Lower 
bound Estimate
Upper 
bound
Lower 
bound Estimate
Upper 
bound
Lower 
bound Estimate
Upper 
bound
Exports, total 1519 1756 1993 117 138 158 1512 1748 1984
Conservative product classification
 Differentiated exports 307 385 462 48 61 74 306 383 460
 Reference-priced exports 722 1012 1302 0 15 24 718 1007 1296
 Organized exchange exports 323 405 486 32 56 79 322 403 484
Liberal product classification
 Differentiated exports 250 327 403 38 50 63 249 325 401
 Reference-priced exports 185 272 359 0 20 33 184 271 357
 Organized exchange exports 1226 1494 1762 38 61 83 1220 1487 1754
Non-manufactured goods exports 169 275 381 0 0 11 168 274 379
 SITC-0: Food and live animals 0 59 98 0 0 4 0 58 97
 SITC-1: Beverages and tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 SITC-2: Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0 24 39 –6 0 0 0 24 39
 SITC-3: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0 0 101 –3 0 3 0 101
 SITC-4: Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Manufactured goods exports 63 118 172 0 16 34 63 117 171
 SITC-5: Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 0 8 14 0 0 3 0 8 14
 SITC-6: Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 0 17 32 –3 0 3 0 17 32
 SITC-7: Machinery and transport equipment 24 36 48 10 14 18 24 36 48
 SITC-8: Miscellaneous manufactured articles 2 4 6 0 0 2 2 4 6
 SITC-9: Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 44 79 114 0 13 23 44 79 114
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Imports, total 387 569 752 99 134 168 385 567 749
Conservative product classification
 Differentiated imports 465 619 774 42 59 76 463 617 771
 Reference-priced imports –51 0 47 –10 0 0 –50 0 46
 Organized exchange imports 0 27 54 109 143 177 1 27 54
Liberal product classification
 Differentiated imports 419 565 713 38 56 73 417 563 710
 Reference-priced imports –45 0 0 –8 0 0 –45 0 0
 Organized exchange imports 47 77 106 108 134 160 47 77 107
Non-manufactured goods imports 130 166 201 10 15 21 130 165 200
 SITC-0: Food and live animals 70 86 101 6 8 10 70 85 100
 SITC-1: Beverages and tobacco 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 2
 SITC-2: Crude materials, inedible, except fuels –7 0 8 0 2 3 –7 0 8
 SITC-3: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 1
 SITC-4: Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manufactured goods imports 0 76 153 –59 –39 –20 0 75 152
 SITC-5: Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 0 12 26 0 0 5 0 12 25
 SITC-6: Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 0 48 99 –12 0 0 0 47 98
 SITC-7: Machinery and transport equipment –20 0 0 –43 –34 –26 –20 0 0
 SITC-8: Miscellaneous manufactured articles 21 30 39 0 4 7 20 29 38
 SITC-9: Commodities and transactions n.e.c. –1 0 0 –2 –1 0 –1 0 0
Per-immigrant effects are estimated using coefficients presented above and observed changes in immigrant stock values and trade values. Lower bound and upper bound
estimates are generated using 95% confidence intervals constructed around each significant immigrant stock coefficients.
NWAP home countries WAP home countries All home countries
Trade Measure
Lower 
bound Estimate
Upper 
bound
Lower 
bound Estimate
Upper 
bound
Lower 
bound Estimate
Upper 
bound
Table 4. Continued.
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equation (2) using Tobit and Pooled Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE)
specifications. The Tobit specification is appropriate when dependent variables
are censored. Of aggregate export and import values in the dataset, 14.4% and
20.8%, respectively, are equal to zero.10 Following Eaton and Tamura (1994)
and Head and Ries (1998), we modify our estimation equation to obtain a
specification that permits the realization of zero trade values. While use of the
PCSE estimation strategy is based on variance estimates which require the
assumption of  many observations per panel, it also allows for panel-level
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of observations between
the panels. In estimating the PCSE, we employ the Prais-Winsten method as
it is the only method that allows FGLS assuming an AR(1) process in the
disturbances.11 We find the results from the Tobit and PCSE estimations
provide proportional immigrant effects that are comparable to the FGLS
results presented in columns (c) and (d) of Table 2. Further, estimated coefficients
on the remaining explanatory variables are also generally consistent with estimates
from the iterative FGLS method.
As a sample robustness check, we also estimate equation (2) using our full
complement of aggregate and disaggregate trade values and removing one nation
from our sample at a time, repeating the process for 101 successive rounds.
For example, in the first round we exclude Algeria, while the second round
includes Algeria but excludes Argentina. Considerable variation in immigrant
effects once a nation is removed implies that the excluded nation has a significant
impact on the results for the full sample. In total, 3838 estimations were per-
formed, resulting in 7676 estimated proportional immigrant effects.12 In nearly
all cases (94.4%), estimated immigrant effects lay within 95% confidence intervals
constructed around estimates obtained for the full sample. When variation is
found, it is slightly more likely to involve immigrants from NWAP nations;
however, even for this cohort, 94% of the estimated effects lay within the con-
fidence intervals. In comparison, robustness checks of immigrant effects for
WAP nations reveal 94.9% lay within corresponding intervals.
4. 
We have addressed one facet of the immigration issue: the possible influence
that relaxation of a restrictive immigration policy has on trade flows. While
the White Australia policy is specific to Australian history, the analysis pre-
sented here provides general insights into the immigrant-trade relationship. In
identifying a positive influence of immigrants on trade, we find that immigrants
from WAP nations exert greater proportional influences on Australian imports
10 We chose to forego use of the Tobit specification in the primary estimations as it is possible that
a zero level of imports and/or exports is natural for some countries, and especially so for disag-
gregated trade values.
11 All estimation results corresponding to our robustness checks are available upon request.
12 For each excluded country, 38 estimations (utilizing aggregate and disaggregated trade measures)
are undertaken, each producing a WAP immigrant effect and an NWAP immigrant effect.
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from their respective home countries than do immigrants from NWAP nations,
while immigrants from NWAP nations exert stronger influences on Australian
exports to their home countries. The finding of pro-trade influences supports
the notion that immigrants increase trade between home and host nations via
preference effects and through social/business network connections and/or the
exploitation of information asymmetries.
We also report significant variation in the immigrant-trade relationship across
product classifications, non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors, and one-
digit SITC goods. The observed variation underscores that an immigrant’s ability
to influence exports and/or imports is a function of the immigrant’s preferences
and, given existing host-home country (dis)similarities, the immigrant’s ability
to take advantage of the opportunities afforded. Taken collectively, our findings
suggest that immigration which leads to increased cultural pluralism and a
corresponding change in a host nation’s cultural identity may have positive
repercussions on the nation’s trade. We posit that abandonment of the White
Australian policy led to increased cultural pluralism and, thus, contributed to
the conditions (i.e. the information asymmetries and potential for exploitation
of network connections) under which immigrants from NWAP nations are
found to influence trade.
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SITC one-digit Industry Sector and Description: Non-manufacturing sectors:
0 – Food and live animals; 1 – Beverages and tobacco; 2 – Crude materials, inedible,
except fuels; 3 – Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; 4 – Animal
and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. Manufacturing sectors: 5 – Chemicals and
related products, not elsewhere classified; 6 – Manufactured goods classified
chiefly by material; 7 – Machinery and transport equipment; 8 – Miscellaneous
manufactured articles; 9 – Commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified.
